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DEMOCRACY, VIOLENCE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
IN THE SHADOW OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION THEORY
TUAN SAMAHONt
Professor Richard Albert's ambitious article Democratic Revolu-
tions argues that elements of political revolution long thought by social
scientists to be essential-mass mobilization, rapidity, violence-are not,
in fact, the sine qua non of revolution.' The term "revolution" captures a
broader political and legal phenomenon than just the episodic, violent,
mass-mobilized political conflagration.2 Traditional political taxono-
mists, contenting themselves with classifying revolutions based on the
supposed procedural criteria, neglected to acknowledge that not all revo-
lutions are created equal.3 Albert responds to this value-free approach by
advancing a normative theory of "democratic revolution" that attempts to
distinguish legitimate democratic revolutions, such as the American
Revolution, from illegitimate, non-democratic ones, such as the Russian
Revolution. To this end, Albert relies on Emmanuel Sieybs's concept of
the People as le pouvoir constituant (constituting power) and proposes a
need for "continuing" legitimacy, i.e., a revolution is democratic when
the People have consented to the revolution as a legitimate course of
action, and consented to and framed institutions that advance liberal
democratic rights on an ongoing basis. Ultimately, his project seeks to
rehabilitate, to legitimate, to justify the democratic revolution, which has
been sullied by its inattentive grouping with its undesirable, undemocrat-
ic cousin, and to make clear what is essential to a democratic revolution.6
This response essay identifies two objections to this thesis. In Part I,
I argue that the "democratic" in democratic revolution is greatly overrat-
ed. Democracy is one desirable aspect of Western democratic govern-
ance, but it is in considerable tension with other features of constitutional
government, including the protection of minority interests. In particular,
democracy harbors the risk of unruly and ill-informed majoritarianism.
In Part II, I develop the argument that, generally speaking, whether or
not violence or its threat is a sine qua non of democratic revolution-hood,
violence, or at the very least its threat, very often does accompany revo-
lution. Several of Professor Albert's cited historical episodes do not sup-
f Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law
1. Richard Albert, Democratic Revolutions 2, 9-14 (Mar. 20, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2, 8.
4. Id. at 7-9.
5. Id. at 33-36.
6. Id at 3-4, 5.
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port, and indeed undermine, his thesis. Finally, in Part III, I consider
constitutional revision and interpretation in the shadow of democratic
revolution theory and ask whether Albert's account could currently justi-
fy democratic revolution in the United States.
I. DEMOCRACY IS NOT AN UNMITIGATED GOOD
Professor Albert proposes a new political taxonomy to differentiate
a good revolution from a bad one, or as he conceptualizes it, a "demo-
cratic" from a non-democratic revolution. By "democratic" revolution,
he does not mean a revolution initiated by the masses rather than political
elites. His article clarifies that elites may initiate and execute a revolu-
tion; mass mobilization is not a necessary condition for democratic revo-
lution.7 Instead, by "democratic," he means those revolutions that "in-
crease the range of liberty of citizens, expand opportunities to exercise
liberal democratic rights and freedoms, and to multiply popular choice."
Such a revolution is located-and ranked-along "the scale of right-
eousness" depending on how much it "advances the cause of freedom
and weakens the forces of oppression."9
The "democratic" in "democratic revolution," however, has its
downsides, and there are good reasons not to be as sanguine as Albert
about unbridled majoritarianism. Democratic revolution theory places
emphasis on "the People" being the constituting power; yet "the People"
do not all hold the same collective view. indeed, the theory calls for
counter-revolutionaries to contest the revolution.o The possibility of
dissent among the People-and unless we are to dehumanize the counter-
revolutionaries, they too form a portion of the People-means that the
theory of democratic revolution may overemphasize democracy at the
expense of other desirable structural features of Western liberal govern-
ments, such as constitutional pre-comniitment, the protection of minority
interests, and political structures like separation of powers and federalism
designed to promote deliberation and disperse power. Democracy, by
definition, is at some level majoritarian: when controversies arise in a
pluralistic democracy, factions resolve their political disputes with resort
to some version of "majority rules" for election, legislation, confirmation
of appointees, and decision-making on collegial courts.
Unruly majoritarianism not tempered with due regard to delibera-
tion and republican civic virtue, however, may lead to outcomes for po-
litical minorities that prove insensitive, unfair, discriminatory, and op-
pressive. Consider the familiar case of a revolutionary war for independ-
ence from colonial hegemonic rule, only to be followed by the rule of an
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id. at 39-40.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 32-33.
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ethnic majority that neglects or oppresses a minority's interests." In such
a case, it may be said that, although there may be "constituting" legiti-
macy ab initio in throwing off a colonial ruler, there is no continuing
legitimacy-at least with regard to the minority of individuals who
would revolt, for example, to form a separate state. Of course, this fur-
ther fracturing and lack of continuing legitimacy can continue as an (al-
most) ad infinitum loop, particularly when one considers changes in ma-
joritarian preferences over time. Thus, democratic revolution theory jus-
tifies a relentless and vicious cycle: democratic revolution against op-
pressive government, new democratic government constituted, majoritar-
ian oppression of minority, rinse and repeat. Given the reality of
majoritarianism and the inevitability of a dissenting minority, it is un-
clear where the end to justified democratic revolution really lies.
Consider the example of voter initiatives and referenda, often au-
thorized among the Western states of the United States, to legislate ma-
joritarian political preferences more than occasionally at the expense of a
political minority.'2 The citizen initiative permits voters to bypass a leg-
islature's usual role and its procedures in lawmaking or constitution
amending." Presumably, initiatives occur because elected representa-
tives, in their exercise of republican deliberation, reject the popular-
supported measure as full of personal political hazard, imprudent, uncon-
stitutional, etc. Often courts play a politically moderating
countermajoritarian role as vindicator of entrenched rights even as
against popular initiatives. During a revolution, however, judges acqui-
esce to majoritarian demands, as Albert would probably acknowledge.14
In such a case, democracy is more likely to take the form of raw
majoritarianism rather than consensus-seeking facilitated by structures
like federalism or the separation of powers. Accordingly, the stated ob-
jects of democratic revolution, i.e., to "increase the range of liberty of
citizens" and "to multiply popular choice," 5 may potentially conflict
with one another, at least with regard to the liberty of citizens with mi-
nority interests adverse to the popular choice of "King Numbers."' 6
11. See, e.g., S. J. TAMBIAH, SRI LANKA: ETHNIC FRATRICIDE AND THE DISMANTLING OF
DEMOCRACY 13, 17, 70-72 (1986) (describing post-independence implementation of democratic
majoritarian policies that discriminated against ethnic and linguistic minority).
12. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996) (discussing Colorado's 1992
statewide referendum "Amendment 2").
13. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § I (reserving to the People "[t]he power to propose laws
and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the
general assembly and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act
or item, section, or part of any act of the general assembly").
14. Cf Albert, supra note 1, at 21
15. Id. at 39.
16. RUSSELL KIRK, JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE 73-74, 553-54 0 (characterizing legisla-




Beyond the problem of unruly majoritarianism lies the related diffi-
culty of an ill-informed majoritarianism. When "the People" are ill in-
formed in the context of either a functioning government or a revolution-
ary period, their consent may not be properly given. The "consent" may
be intentional and voluntary, but not knowing. We know that political
ignorance is widespread, and perhaps rationally so.' 7 Public choice sug-
gests that when interest groups are large and transaction costs to com-
municate and organize are high relative to the benefits, the free rider
problem makes it unlikely they will mobilize to petition government of-
ficials or otherwise register their preferences. 8 In such a case, those
elected representatives may prove inattentive to the People's real con-
cerns, appealing to them only through symbolic gestures, perhaps nation-
alistic or jingoistic, and the representatives may focus on their own self-
interest or those of well-organized interest groups whose costs to organ-
ize are low relative to the benefits for doing so. This knowledge and at-
tention gap makes mental consent unlikely on the part of the People and
therefore requires the fallback substitute of performative consent, i.e.,
acquiescence. But acquiescence as consent may mean that the practice of
democratic government differs significantly from its theory. The passive
consent of acquiescence "does not distinguish among grudging, reluctant,
or enthusiastic acceptance."19 The gap along that spectrum suggests the
institutions created to act on behalf of the People may be ill policed due
to public apathy resulting in the public choice problems of governance.
More seriously, acquiescence as consent also suggests that a demo-
cratic government may have difficulty living up to the "continuing legit-
imacy" expectations of democratic revolution theory, which is no small
problem given that the key distinguishing feature of a democratic revolu-
tion is whether it "exhibit[s] constituting and continuing legitimacy."20
After all, under democratic revolution theory, the People as the constitut-
ing power "can, as it pleases, revoke its consent from those constituted
institutions, and once again constitute new powers for new institutions
staffed by new individuals."2 1 Contrary to Albert, such a result, if his
22justifying theory were embraced, could invite further revolution, or
attempts at it, if nothing but acquiescence or consent by a majority were
required. Revolution tends to be contagious-consider Europe in 1848,
Eastern Europe in 1989, or the so-called Arab Spring in 2010 and con-
tinuing into 2011-and it may be that the phlegmatic People acquiesce
17. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspec-
tive on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304-13 (2004).
18. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 29, 33-35, 48 (1965).
19. Albert, supra note 1, at 38.
20. Id. at 39.
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 38.
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until some external force awakens them from their slumber. When they
awaken, the consequences may be tumultuous.
II. REVOLUTION DOES OFTEN INVOLVE VIOLENCE OR ITS THREAT
Albert wishes to emphasize the substance of a revolution's end-
i.e., whether it is democratic or non-democratic-rather than the proce-
dural means by which it may come to pass.23 In particular, he disputes
the necessity of the relationship between revolution and violence (or its
threat).24 His burden is heavy, however. Political revolution is intimately
tied with violence and tumult. Eugene Delacroix's painting Liberty Lead-
ing the People, which portrays the French July Revolution of 1830, epit-
omizes that connection. 25 Delacroix personifies Liberty as a determined
French peasant woman striding across the dead bodies of the fallen forc-
es of reaction.26 She draws after her a ragtag-but-noble band of armed
revolutionary irregulars as she leads, musket with bayonet in one hand,
tricolor in the other.27 Delacroix has accurately captured the violent spirit
of most revolutions. Rebuttal of that fixed association requires good his-
torical exemplars of nonviolent revolution.
To meet this burden, Albert proposes several counterexamples of
revolutions that were ostensibly non-violent events. Contrary to his as-
sertion, those events that count as revolutions, at least under his ap-
proach, 28 all presented actual violence, or at least involved its very sub-
stantial threat. To begin, Albert offers the example of the Glorious Revo-
lution of 1688 as a pre-twentieth century revolution that he claims de-
links revolution and violence and for which violence-oriented traditional
revolutionary theory "would find trouble accounting." 29 Although the
Glorious Revolution in England is styled "Bloodless," historians
acknowledge that label is misleading.3 0 In fact, it involved a Dutch inva-
23. Id at 7, 66.
24. Id at 14-17.
25. BARTHELEMY JOBERT, DELACROIX 128-33 (Terry Grabar & Alexandra Bonfante-Warren
eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1998) (1997).
26. Id. at 132.
27. Id.
28. It is unclear whether the Georgian, Hungarian, Polish, or Ukranian revolutions count as
revolutions under Albert's own definition. For example, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which
challenged disputed parliamentary elections, see JONATHAN WHEATLEY, GEORGIA FROM NATIONAL
AWAKENING TO ROSE REVOLUTION, DELAYED TRANSITION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 183
(2005), would not constitute a revolution for Albert because it does not meet the requirement of
"nonconstitutionality." The Supreme Court of Georgia nullified the prior election results for 150
proportional seats and a new parliamentary election was held to elect new representatives under the
same constitution (albeit amended through the formally ordained amendment process), see id. at
194-95. As the revolutionaries sought to vindicate and amend the constitution rather than overturn it,
it is unclear the revolution met Albert's requirement of "nonconstitutionality,". See Albert, supra
note 1, at 23, 24. Accordingly, the fact that these "revolutions" were non-violent does not establish
Albert's point.
29. Albert, supra note 1, at 16.
30. TIM HARRIS, REVOLUTION: THE GREAT CRISIS OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1685-1720,
at 275 (2006).
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sion with an assembled army of over 14,000,31 attendant bloodshed dur-
ing battles outside Dorchester, in Reading, and at Wincanton, 32 and riot-
ing anti-Catholic mobs 3 3-in short, both actual and threatened violence
characterized the revolution. If the Glorious Revolution supports any
proposition about revolutionary violence, it is only the modest claim that
occasionally revolutions end mercifully quickly with less violence and
loss of life than might have occurred if the established order had not mis-
calculated the likelihood of revolution and quickly capitulated on the
battlefield.
In some of the counterexamples, Albert defines what counts as vio-
lence too narrowly because he apparently excludes violence and threats
of violence on the part of the establishment. But counterrevolutionaries,
not just the revolutionaries, may perpetrate violence. 35 Consider the sup-
posed "nonviolent" struggle for Indian independence.36 The British colo-
nial forces responded to revolutionaries with extreme prejudice on sever-
al occasions. For example, in 1930 the British massacred some 200-250
nonviolent Indian protestors at the Kabuli Gate in Peshawar when they
opened fire on the crowd with machine guns.37 Their violent deaths re-
fute the notion that the Indian revolution was nonviolent, at least when
the colonial power's violence is considered.
Moreover, it is a mistake to focus only on Gandhi's nonviolent
campaign for India's independence. The lengthy fight for India's inde-
pendence was multifaceted and included violence employed against the
British by Indian revolutionaries, such as the efforts of Subhash Chandra
Bose and the Indian National Army, revolutionaries not affiliated with
Gandhi's non-violent resistance movement. 3 8 Further, consider the Indi-
ans' considerable numerical advantage as against the British. When large
numbers of discontent protesters greatly outnumber a foreign occupying
force, can it truly be said that the threat of violence is ever far away? The
in terrorem effect on the British would have been potent.
31. W.A. SPECK, RELUCTANT REVOLUTIONARIES, ENGLISHMEN AND THE REVOLUTION OF
1688, at 79 (1988).
32. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 275, 295 (reporting thirty dead at Wincanton, fifty-three at
Dorchester, and thirty to fifty at Reading).
33. SPECK, supra note 31, at 89; HARRIS supra note 30, at 296, 372 76 (describing anti-
Catholic mobs in England and Scotland).
34. SPECK, supra note 31, at 80, 87.
35. Even Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Revolution" featured riot police who violently suppressed
peaceful student demonstrations by attacking them with truncheons. MICHAEL LONG, MAKING
HISTORY, CZECH VOICES OF DISSENT AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1989, at 19-20 (2005). There was
very much the threat of violence by the old guard, including (apparently) a student death at the hands
of the police, though this report of a death later proved false, id. at 20, 124.
36. Albert, supra note 1, at 16-17.
37. Irfan Habib, Civil Disobedience 1930-31, 25 SOCIAL SCIENTIST 55-56 (1997), available
at www.jstor.org/stable/3517680.
38. PETER WARD FAY, THE FORGOTTEN ARMY: INDIA'S ARMED STRUGGLE FOR
INDEPENDENCE, 1942-1945, at 1-2, 5-6 (1993).
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Other proffered counterexamples of "nonviolence" fare no better
under a definition of "violence" that encompasses the old regime's re-
sistance. The Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan featured violence initially in
the city of Jalalabad as the government "deployed internal troops to sup-
press civilian protesters" in clashes that left dozens wounded. Interior
Ministry troops also attacked protestors in the capital of Bishkek with
more than twenty hospitalized and two hundred arrested.4 0 Crowds then
captured the principal government building while widespread looting and
arson occurred, allegedly by counterrevolutionaries. 4 1 The weeks that
followed would also be marred by political assassination.42
Of course, it is impossible to know ab initio whether a democratic
revolutionary undertaking will turn violent because revolutions are com-
plex and inherently chaotic events. The possibility of a true revolution
unfolding without violence or its threat cannot be ruled out. One need
not, however, establish that all revolutions are violent. It is enough that
they frequently are violent. This concurrence of violence and revolution
suggests the relationship is not accidental. Accordingly, too readily justi-
fying revolution should give one pause. Consider the project of the social
contract theorists and their discussion of the theoretical "state of nature"
as a type of justification, or alternatively rejection, of revolution. How
readily a Locke or a Hobbes justified or rejected revolution turned on
their alternative conceptions of the state of nature, which would obtain
during the disorder accompanying revolution. If an absence of civil au-
thority is more akin to Locke's great "Inconveniences of the State of
Nature . . . where Men may be Judges in their own Case,"4 3 revolution
might more readily be justified. Conversely, if Hobbes is correct that
"the life of man" in a revolutionary state of nature is "solitary, poor[],
nasty, brutish, and short,"" that alternative looks less appealing than
simply tolerating a monarch, even if one's liberty is constrained.
To be sure, revolution is occasionally justified-even acknowledg-
ing the probability of attendant violence. Those occasions, however,
must be carefully weighed in light of the likelihood that violence will
accompany them. The traditional theorist's focus on the violent proce-
dure of revolution suggests prudence about those weighty substantive
reasons adequate to justify it.4 5 If Albert were to defend a more modest
39. ERICA MARAT, THE TULIP REVOLUTION: KYRGYZSTAN ONE YEAR AFTER, MARCH 15,
2005-MARCH 24,2006, at 5 (2006).
40. Id at 129.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 130.
43. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 293-94 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
44. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 65 (Ernest Rhys ed., E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc. 1940) (1651).
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (reflecting a similar sentiment,
"Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light
and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to
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proposition about revolution and violence-i.e., revolutions may often be
violent, but less bloody than supposed-we would need to ask the further
question what quantum of violence would be acceptable in order for a
democratic revolution to be justified? Given the imperfect state of the art
of political forecasting, it may be that no satisfactory answer to the revo-
lutionary question could be offered.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (AND INTERPRETATION) IN THE SHADOW
OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION THEORY
In the first portion of this response essay, I suggested that the "dem-
ocratic" in democratic revolution might prove undesirable. Although
majority rule is an essential component of democracy, majoritarianism is
in tension with other aspects of liberal governance, including the consti-
tutional protection of minority interests and structures designed to pro-
mote consensus. Accordingly, the emphasis on the "democratic" in dem-
ocratic revolution implies a version of majority rules to constitute a legit-
imate governing institution without any necessary regard for these other
features of Western-style governance. In the essay's second part, I sepa-
rately questioned whether a true Albertian revolution could be truly non-
violent by illustrating that the historical record is less than reassuring on
this count. In this portion of the essay, I argue that in light of revolution's
majoritarian and violent realities, it is desirable to avoid revolution by
facilitating a measure of democratic but deliberative control. Thus, the
essay considers constitutional revision and interpretation in the shadow
of democratic revolution theory. To do so, it asks whether Albert's ac-
count would currently justify democratic revolution in the United States
or whether Article V and "interpretation" can adequately serve the ends
that a democratic revolution might otherwise seek to attain.
As previously argued, revolution, even democratic revolution, could
very likely prove violent and majoritarian in its most crassly undesirable
sense. Assuming it is desirable to avoid unfiltered majoritarian outcomes,
or at least the violent process, how could "continuing legitimacy" be
secured through nonviolent, democratically legitimate change? Histori-
cally, one agent for facilitating constitutional change in the U.S. system
has been the judiciary's sub rosa amendment of the Constitution under
guise of interpreting a constitutional text characterized as ambiguous, or
at least as underdetermined. Albert anticipates interpretation-qua-
revision as a nonviolent species of democratic revolution as his theory
attempts to account for, and ratify, among other things, constitutional
restructuring that occurs outside formally authorized procedures, such as
suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed.").
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that constitutional order that emerged outside of Article V during the
New Deal settlement.4 6
Perhaps the difficulty of the formal supermajoritarian process and
the asserted exigency to respond to changed circumstances might be in-
voked as a justification for interpretation-qua-amendment. But this ap-
proach fails both a criterion of the democratic revolution and a critique of
it. First, if one rejects the hyperrealist indeterminacy premise, then the
use of constitutional interpretation to legitimate amendment-in-fact suc-
ceeds only because "We the People" are inattentive, ignorant, or de-
ceived. Albert accepts that the acquiescence-as-consent essential to con-
stituting and continuing legitimacy may encompass "grudging, reluctant
or enthusiastic acceptance,"4 7 but does that consent also embrace acqui-
escence predicated on inattention, ignorance, or deception? If so, contin-
uing legitimacy may prove a rather empty concept. Second, in the partic-
ular case of the New Deal, interpretation-as-amendment occurred with-
out violence, but it remained decidedly majoritarian. The Court's expan-
sion of the national government's authority was not costless to private
minority interests. Consider Carolene Products and its famous footnote
four: the Court ratified the majoritarian exercise of legislative power
through a presumption of constitutionality that restricted claims of indi-
- 48vidual right against the national government.
If judicial interpretation-as-amendment is an inadequate device for
maintaining continuing legitimacy under the U.S. Constitution, does the
formal mechanism of Article V adequately serve the ends that a demo-
cratic revolution might otherwise seek to attain? If not, does its
supermajoritarian structure justify an appeal to democratic revolution
theory and nonconstitutional action?
It is perhaps ironic that one generation's revolutionaries may be the
defenders of the next generation's establishment, but it remains that the
Philadelphia Convention drafted a document resistant to facile amend-
ment. Article V accommodates demand for democratic change, but does
so by allowing only clear supermajorities to have their way. Although the
procedural rules facilitate the avoidance of revolution and its violent haz-
46. Albert, supra note 1, at 9, 18. In this sense, Albert's project draws upon and parallels
efforts, for example, by Bruce Ackerman and Mark Tushnet, to explain and justify constitutional
change outside Article V's formal rules for amendment. Democratic revolutions with constituting
and continuing legitimacy are his answer to Ackerman's constitutional moment resulting from
constitutional politics. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 10-31
(1998). Those democratic revolutions are his answer to Tushnet's constitutional hardball. See also
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004) (describing constitu-
tional hardball as a strategy for altering constitutional orders).
47. Albert, supra note 1, at 38.
48. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be nar-
rower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.").
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ards by forcing consensus before allowing change, Article V denies a
simple majority its right to govern as it pleases. Indeed, it promotes "the
more general constitutional principle of republicanism, which attempts to
promote the public good within a system of popular representation'9
more than it attempts to promote democracy. A strongly deliberative
process, however, is not costless if it produces veto gates from which
proposed amendments may not emerge. Initiation of the amendment pro-
cess requires bicameral two-third supermajorities with a requirement that
three-fourths of state legislatures, or conventions in them, ratify any
amendment.o The alternative of a constitutional convention, where two-
thirds of the state legislatures initiate the process whereby constitutional
amendments may be proposed with the same three-fourths rule for ratifi-
cation, is no less demanding.5' Indeed, that there have been only twenty-
seven successful amendments, ten secured as an early negotiated political
compromise, demonstrate the formal Article V process is not very demo-
cratically responsive.
Moreover, Article V is likely to be even less effective when ad-
dressing matters where the institutional or individual interests of Article
V gatekeepers-the prerogatives of Congress and its members or the
interests of the several States-are directly at stake. Consider a hypothet-
ical repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment, which itself repealed state
legislative selection of senators and provided for direct election of U.S.
senators.5 2 To the extent that it were thought such an amendment would
subject senators to renewed state legislative accountability, such an
amendment would never be proposed. Thus, Congress and the States
act as important gatekeepers for initiating the Article V process.
This conclusion suggests that Article V would inadequately address
the demands of democratic revolution theory and, depending on the par-
ticular democratic demand (e.g., the redistributive demands of the "Oc-
cupy Wall Street" movement were it to win majoritarian support), 4
49. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX.
L. REv. 703, 705 (2002).
50. U.S. CONST. art. V.
51. To complicate matters further, Article V provides that a state may not be stripped of its
equal representation in the Senate (i.e., two senators per state) without its consent. U.S. CONST. art.
V. This provision gives a state an effective veto power over any such amendment.
52. U.S. CONsT. art. XVII.
53. The ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, which provides that "[n]o law, vary-
ing the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an
election of Representatives shall have intervened," is not to the contrary. James Madison proposed
the original amendment as a part of the Bill of Rights. Jay M. Zitter, Construction and Operation of
Twenty-Seventh Amendment to United States Constitution Relating to Congressional Compensation,
95 A.L.R.5th 459 (2002). Its ratification required over two hundred years and Article V required no
further action by Congress. Id.
54. Douglas Schoen, Polling the Occupy Wall Street Crowd, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 18, 2011),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001 424052970204479504576637082965745362.html
(noting his firm's polling of 200 protestors in New York's Zuccotti Park and reporting that 65%
favor guaranteed health care, education, and retirement and 77% favor increasing taxation on
wealthiest, while 58% oppose increasing taxation on all).
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could justify a new American Revolution. If constituting or continuing
legitimacy is at its heart a claim about a democratic majority being able
to rule, then likely Article V would not deliver. One might alternatively
consider an Article V amendment to the way in which we amend under
Article V. Authorizing additional tools to more easily amend the docu-
ment, perhaps by disintermediating the gatekeepers, could possibly meet
the demands of his theory."
Of course, such concessions to Albert's theory would prioritize de-
mocracy over republicanism, constitutionalism, and other desirable fea-
tures of Western-style liberal governance. Moreover, if his premise that
revolution has no necessary association with violence is untrue, as I have
argued it is, Article V rightfully becomes more attractive as a delibera-
tive mechanism for change that seeks broad consensus and change with-
out the inevitable bloodshed that attends the People's irregular exercise
of constituting power.
CONCLUSION
This response essay identified two objections to Albert's democratic
revolution theory. First, democracy is but one desirable aspect of govern-
ance. Its overemphasis is in tension with the protection of minority inter-
ests and the consensus-seeking features of constitutionalism. Second,
whether or not violence or its threat is a defining characteristic of revolu-
tion, violence and its threat often do attend revolution. In light of the
undesirability of crass majoritarianism and revolutionary violence, this
essay considered whether his theory could be accommodated either by
interpretation-as-amendment or by the Article V method for amending
the document. Neither would suffice to satisfy the demands of his demo-
cratic revolutionary theory. That conclusion stands, reductio ad absur-
dum, as a strong suggestion that the premises of democratic revolution-
ary theory are mistaken.
55. These tools might assume the form of a national citizen petition or a revision commission
convened periodically to assess the document. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. Xl, § 2 (providing for
revision commission that convenes every twenty years to consider amendments to Florida Constitu-
tion).
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